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1. For the preparation of the document "Investor Sentiment and the 1994 Mexican Currency 
Crisis", I reviewed the following main sources of information: (a) official documents from the 
Mexican government, which presented antecedents, contents and goals of the economic policies 
applied in the country since the late 1980s; (b) speeches by top government officials reflecting 
their views on critical issues concerning the topic under research; (c) publications from the 
Executive and the staff of the IMF, concerning aspects of interest to the research; (d) published 
analyses and opinions by the private sector, particularly in the financial sector; (e) official data 
from Banco de Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (SHCP), and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI); and (f) academic papers in 
professional journals. Critically, in all cases [except (e) and (f)] attention was paid to views 
expressed at the time events under study were unfolding. 
2. I presented a preliminary version of the document at the Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat 
Annual Forum, in Muldersdrift, South Africa, September 1999. 
3. The anticipated meetings of the project "Assessing Investor Sentiment" have not so far been 
carried out, and thus it was not possible to benefit from a direct exchange of ideas with 
researchers studying the 1997 East Asia financial crises. However, I would like to mention my 
willingness to attend future meetings of the project and after that make any necessary changes 
that may improve the final document which I am submitting. 
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Investor Sentiment and the 1994 Mexican Currency Crisis 
Abstract 
This document describes the views from the Mexican government, the IMF and private 
investors before, during and immediately after the 1994 currency crisis in Mexico. It 
characterizes the dramatic turnabout in investor sentiment in the early nineties, and speculates 
about its relationship with the economic policies followed by the Mexican authorities. It shows 
that developments which later on have generally been regarded as determinants of the crisis 
and for which there was available information, were in the early nineties not considered as 
troublesome. It studies . the evolution of expectations among investors before the , peso 
devaluation of December 1994, and its relationship with observed capital inflows, portfolio 
recompositions and interest rate differentials. It argues that the eventual stabilization of the 
domestic financial markets after weeks of severe turmoil following the devaluation required 
both a strong tightening of fiscal and monetary policies and international financial support. 
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The years leading up to the currency crisis of December 1994 in Mexico represent a remarkable 
period in the country's recent economic history, a period characterized by important changes in 
both macroeconomic performance and the orientation of the government's economic policies. 
With the antecedent of several years of high inflation and depressed levels of economic activity, 
the eighties ended after the launch of a new stabilization program which was based on an 
explicit incomes policy anchored by the nominal exchange rate. The strategy resulted in a 
process of disinflation which was quite intense in its initial stage, and was accompanied by a 
resumption of output growth. Over time, however, the basic elements of what some authors 
have called the Mexican disease developed: these included massive inflows of portfolio 
investment, a boom in bank lending and private consumption, a steady process of real currency 
appreciation and rising current account deficits, and falling GDP growth rates. Remarkably, 
despite these problems external capital kept flowing into the country right up to the peso 
devaluation of December 1994. 
Short term macroeconomic management during the Salinas administration (1989-1994) was 
guided by the ultimate goal of bringing domestic inflation down to international levels. In such 
context, the pace of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate was consistently set below the 
Mexican-U.S. inflation differential. Thus there was purposeful real currency appreciation. Fiscal 
and monetary policies were defined in accordance with the disinflationary goal. There was a 
steady improvement in the government fiscal position, which for the first time in recent history 
reached an overall surplus. Fiscal adjustment was helped by the successful conclusion, in the 
late eighties, of the renegotiation of the country's commercial bank debt, and by a program of 
privatization of public assets which gained force in the early nineties. An improvement in 
private expectations contributed to establishing a virtuous circle, in that a fall in domestic 
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interest rates tended to strengthen the government finances, which in turn reinforced policy 
credibility. 
A program of structural reform, aimed at reducing the government's role in the economy, also 
played a significant role. Basic ingredients were the privatization of public assets and the 
deregulation of markets, notably in the financial and external sectors. The process of trade 
liberalization, in particular, culminated with the signature of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) by Canada, Mexico and the U.S. in December 1992, and ratified by the 
U.S. Congress in November 1993. 
There was a broad coincidence between the policies followed by the Mexican authorities and 
those recommended by the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, there was a steady 
improvement in the market assessment of the country's outlook. Overnight, the terms of 
funding turned more favorable and Mexico became the main recipient of financial flows in the 
developing world. The announced exchange rate policy became increasingly credible among 
market participants, leading to a situation of full credibility by mid 1993. Not surprisingly, both 
the Mexican government and the IMF attributed the improvement in market sentiment to the 
policies being implemented. 
Despite the overall match between the policies of the Mexican government and those advised 
by the IMF, there were some developments which, from the Fund's standpoint, clearly should 
have been regarded as troublesome. In particular, in the period before the crisis the peso had 
been appreciating in real terms; a rising current account deficit was a reflection more of a fall in 
the domestic saving rate than of higher investment rates; and the Fund was well aware that a 
strategy of financial liberalization followed by a boom in bank lending, as seen in Mexico at the 
time, had led in recent past to banking crises in a number of developed countries. In all cases 
information was readily available that showed the country's actual situation. Nonetheless, the 
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IMF consistently praised the Mexican authorities for their policies. Moreover, investors were 
mostly willing to commit large amounts of money into Mexican assets. It seems as if, in shaping 
their views, both investors and the IMF were impressed more by the type of policies being 
followed than by their actual results. 
Developments in the final months of 1994, before the outbreak of the financial panic, are worth 
looking at. On one side, there were positive assessments of the Mexican situation being issued 
by investment firms, and there was significant foreign investment in peso-denominated assets --
albeit at a reduced scale compared to 1993-- at least up to the third quarter of the year. On the 
other, there was a steady shift of investors holding domestic government debt, from 
peso-denominated cetes to dollar-indexed tesobonos, a sign that exchange rate policy was 
losing credibility. These contrasting observations suggest that before the crisis there was, as 
some have argued, a segmentation of views among investors; since these developments took 
place in the market for very liquid debt, the segmentation concerned mainly expectations about 
the country's short term outlook. In fact, foreign direct (as opposed to portfolio) investment was 
left untouched by the crisis. 
On 20 December 1994, the ceiling of the peso's exchange band against the U.S. dollar was 
devalued 15%, presumably in an attempt to reestablish a more equilibrated value for the real 
exchange rate. The measure, however, was followed by strong speculation against the currency, 
forcing the central bank to withdraw from the foreign exchange market and opening a period of 
rapid currency depreciation. In this light, the question naturally arises of why market 
participants reacted so violently to the initial devaluation: if they were initially concerned about 
the real currency appreciation and its consequences, then the realignment should have eased 
those concerns; if they were instead impressed by the long term prospects opened by the 
program of structural reform, then their behavior should not have been so sensitive to a mere 
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15% variation in nominal parity. Was this an irrational reaction, or were there underlying 
fundamentals justifying a run? 
We approach these issues in the following way. Section 1 sets the macroeconomic background, 
by reviewing some basic indicators of Mexico's economic performance in the early nineties. 
Section 2 describes the crisis triggered by the peso devaluation. Sections 3 and 4 examine the 
views from the Mexican government and the IMF on a number of critical issues, including the 
behavior of the real exchange, the rising current account deficits and the bank lending boom. 
Section 5 takes a first look at the way market sentiment evolved during the period, while section 
6 endeavors to understand how investor sentiment was shaped by different types of shocks. 
Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions. 
1. Macroeconomic background 
For Mexico, most of the eighties were a period of negative capital inflows and stagnation. In 
particular, during 1983-1987 the cumulative current account deficit was minus $13.4 billion and 
the average annual GDP growth rate was only 0.02%. The macroeconomic situation was 
complicated by the dramatic fall of oil prices in export markets during 1986, which led to an 
overall fiscal deficit of 12.8% of GDP in 1988 and a rise in the annual inflation rate from less than 
60% at the end of 1985 to a 178% peak in February 1988. 
Two events defined a turning point late in the decade. First was the introduction, in December 
1987, of a new stabilization program centered on the incomes-policy agreements known as 
pacts. Exchange rate policy played a key role; its specific form, though, changed over time: 
while in a first stage the peso's nominal value against the U.S. dollar was strictly fixed, a 
crawling peg was introduced in January 1989, and then an explicit band with a gliding ceiling 
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and a fixed floor in November 1991. The daily crawl was 0.02 peso cents from 11 November 
1991 through 19 October 1992, and then 0.04 cents until the December 1994 devaluation (for a 
detailed, pre-crisis account, see Schwartz 1994). 
The new program was clearly successful, in that the high inflation rates of the late 1980s 
subsided rapidly: the country moved from having an annual CPI inflation rate of 178% in 
February 1988, to 35% in January 1989, and a record low of 20% in December of that year. Thus, 
disinflation was particularly intense in the initial months. The pace was much slower 
afterwards, and it was only in November 1993 that the country reached single-digit rates (9.9%). 
A second positive shock came in mid 1989, with the conclusion of renegotiations of the 
country's commercial bank debt. This contributed to the remarkable fall in the ratio of public 
external debt to GDP registered during the first years of the nineties. As will be seen, there is 
evidence that the renegotiation was one factor behind the change in international investor 
sentiment toward Mexico early in the decade. Both the debt renegotiation and the improvement 
in private expectations helped the process of fiscal adjustment carried out by the Salinas 
government. 
The basic purpose of macroeconomic management during the administration of President 
Salinas was to eventually bring domestic inflation down to international levels. There was a 
steady improvement in the fiscal accounts, and monetary policy was consistent with a stable 
nominal exchange rate. In 1988 there was an overall fiscal deficit equivalent to 13 GDP points, 
despite a primary surplus of 8% of aggregate output. Two years later, the overall deficit was 
only 3.9% GDP points. For 1991 and 1992, there was an average surplus of 2.75% of GDP 
(excluding the revenue from privatization of public assets yields a figure of minus 0.5). During 
1993 and 1994, there was a reduction in the primary surplus, but nonetheless the overall balance 
remained at 1 % and minus 0.3%, respectively. The fiscal accounts greatly benefited from a fall in 
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domestic interest rates: the annual 28-day cete (treasury bill) rate descended from a 157% peak 
in January 1988 (immediately after the new stabilization program was launched) to less than 
15% before the December 1994 devaluation. Meanwhile, domestic public debt declined from 
19% of GDP in 1988 to 7.6% in 1993, while foreign debt did it from 44% to 14.3% (Dornbusch 
and Werner 1994). 
Throughout the period, and despite the introduction of an explicit target zone with a 
depreciating ceiling, the nominal exchange rate was relatively stable. In December 1987, the 
average interbank buy exchange rate was 2.25 pesos per dollar; by December 1990, the parity 
had increased to 2.94, a proportional variation which was well below the cumulative home-
foreign inflation differential. For the next three years, the parity remained without much 
change, ending in December 1993 at 3.1 pesos per dollar. Naturally, in the context of a large 
inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S., there was a steady appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
The extent of real appreciation can be determined by a comparison of dollar unit labor costs in 
the manufactures in Mexico and the U.S. According to estimates from the National Institute of 
Statistics (INEGI), the Mexican unit labor cost increased 37% between 1990 and 1993, while the 
U.S. counterpart remained constant (figure 1). This increase took place despite an 18% rise in 
labor productivity in Mexico; the reason, of course, was the marked rise in the Mexican nominal 
wage, measured in foreign currency, which shifted from 3.06 dollars per hour in 1990 to 4.9 in 
1993. 
The goals of the disinflationary strategy, and its relation to the exchange rate policy of the 
period, are captured in the so-called Criteria for Economic Policy, submitted annually to 
Congress by the Executive, and which set up the basic antecedents, goals and assumptions for 
policy in the following year. This source shows that in the early 1990s, the announced rate of 
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exchange rate depreciation was consistently below the government inflation rate target for the 
following months. Thus there was purposeful appreciation, even under the assumption that the 
inflation target were met, instead of below the actual rates as was in fact the case. For instance, 
in the Criteria for 1992, submitted in late 1991, the inflation target was just below 10%; in 
contrast, the daily crawl of 0.02 peso cents in the exchange rate band ceiling announced for 
1992, implied a central parity depreciation of only 1.4% (the actual peso depreciation was 1.0%). 
Similarly, the Criteria for 1993 and 1994 set inflation targets of 7 and 5%, respectively, whereas 
the implicit central parity depreciation, given an announced daily crawl of 0.04 in the band 
ceiling, was 2.4 and 2.2%, respectively (the actual exchange rate basically remained unchanged 
during 1993, and suffered a depreciation of 11.4% the following year --up to the devaluation-- as 
a result of the exchange rate having shifted to the band's upper limit after the assassination of 
presidential candidate L. D. Colosio in March 1994). In fact, during 1992 and 1993 the actual rate 
depreciated less than the central parity; the reason, according to some authors, was that the 
central bank consistently intervened to keep the rate in the strong half of the band (Schwartz 
1994). 
As a result of this strategy, the Mexican economy began 1994 with single-digit inflation rates 
and a real exchange rate that had clearly appreciated with respect to its equilibrium level. In this 
sense, the decision to sustain the disinflationary effort led to an increasingly risky situation. The 
outlook for 1994 included, besides a clear tendency toward economic stagnation, a domestic 
inflation rate which presumably was close to its absolute minimum and thus raised doubts 
about the need to stick with a disinflationary parity, and a change of administration scheduled 
for December. 
More specifically, the successful stabilization of the economy had led to a resumption of 
growth, with an annual GDP growth rate of 3.03% for 1988-90, well above the 0.02% registered 
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in the previous five years. However, growth rates declined over time, and by 1993 the economy 
was practically stagnant. In particular, the GDP growth rate fell steadily from 4.5% in 1990 to 
less than 0.7% in 1993. In the external sector, the current account deficit increased from $6 
billion in 1989 to $23 billion in 1993 and nearly $29 billion in 1994 (equivalent to 7.9% of GDP). 
Clearly the current account deterioration cannot be attributed to anything resembling strong 
economic expansion (except perhaps the additional rise in 1994, when the GDP growth rate 
shifted to 3.5%, supported by a reduction in the government primary balance from 4 to 2.3 GDP 
points). 
The rising current account deficit was mostly associated with a fall in the domestic saving rate. 
According to some estimates, out of the 7 GDP point rise in the average current account deficit 
between 1985-89 and 1994, 3 points had as counterpart a higher investment rate and the 
remaining 4 points a lower saving rate (Lustig and Ros 1997). Given the fiscal adjustment 
occurred during the period, this means that the fall in private domestic saving was even 
stronger. The consumption boom was accompanied by a rapid growth in bank lending. 
Between 1989 and 1994, total lending from commercial banks rose from 28% of GDP to more 
than 50%. And as we will see, simultaneously there were massive capital inflows, which 
generated a surplus in the capital account of the balance of payments as the counterpart to the 
current account deficit. 
In summary, the picture that emerges is one of low and declining economic growth caused at 
least in part by the appreciation of the currency; and record high current account deficits, 
financed by massive capital inflows, and related in part to higher investment but mainly to a 
boom in domestic lending and consumption that reduced the private saving rate. 
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2. The crisis 
On 20 December 1994, the Mexican government announced a devaluation in the ceiling of the 
peso's exchange rate band, which resulted in an immediate depreciation of about 15% in the 
actual peso-dollar parity. The realignment became a critical point in the country's recent 
history. As was just described, the previous years had been a period of sustained real currency 
appreciation, in the context of an exchange rate based disinflationary program. The continuous 
rise of domestic wages measured in U.S. dollars had been accompanied by a combination of 
declining GDP growth rates and steeply rising current account deficits. In the course of 1994 
there had been two major speculative attacks against the peso, that had seriously eroded the 
Banco de Mexico's stock of international reserves. Typically, at the time of devaluation reserves 
were falling. With these antecedents, authorities were probably expecting a positive market 
reaction to the revision in exchange rate policy: in the short run, the parity change would lessen 
perceptions of currency misalignment, putting downward pressure on peso interest rates and 
stopping the reserve drain, while over a longer period it would lead to a reduction in the trade 
deficit, slowing down the pace of foreign debt accumulation and promoting domestic output 
growth. 
Quite to the contrary, though, the devaluation opened a period of severe financial turbulence 
that lasted for several months and eventually resulted in the deepest depression the country has 
experienced in decades. The basic facts of the crisis are well known{l}: the exchange rate 
suffered a massive depreciation, shifting from about 3.5 pesos per dollar before the devaluation 
to 7.3 in the first days of March 1995; meanwhile, the annual interest rate on short-term peso 
treasury bills rose from a 14% pre-devaluation level to a monthly average of 75% in April. Not 
surprisingly, financial chaos coupled with the program of fiscal and monetary tightening 
applied by the government to face it, resulted in severe output contraction --with GDP falling 
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6.2% during 1995--, a banking crisis that forced the government to bail out a number of banks, 
and plummeting employment and real wage levels. 
The speculative attacks of 1994 in Mexico were preceded by a remarkably good record in terms 
of international capital flows and the credibility of the government's exchange rate policy. As a 
result of heavy capital inflows registered in the first years of the decade, the central bank's 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves rose from about $10 billion in December 1990 to nearly 
$30 billion in February 1994. Meanwhile, the expected peso depreciation, in excess of the 
announced crawl of the official exchange rate band ceiling, steadily declined from 10% per year 
in late 1992 to minus 8% in the first weeks of March 1994 (see section 5). 
This positive trend was interrupted by the assassination of the ruling party's presidential 
candidate, L. D. Colosio, on 23 March 1994. The political shock produced an erosion in the 
central bank's stock of international reserves, which fell from more than $28 billion in late 
March to less than $18 by mid April. This decline was a reflection of a rapid shift from peso- to 
dollar-denominated assets in the private sector. Indeed, a comparison of end of month figures 
shows a fall of nearly $13 billion in private holdings of domestic bonds between February and 
April, which is close to the $11.5 billion reserve loss registered during the same period. The 
portfolio recomposition consisted of a fall of more than $19.5 billion in holdings of peso-
denominated treasury bills (mainly cetes), that more than offset a $7 billion rise in dollar-
indexed tesobonos (figure 2). 
A second speculative wave began about six months later, extending from early November until 
the peso devaluation. This time, central bank reserves declined from $17 billion to less than $11 
and, in contrast to March's attack, private holdings of domestic bonds did not fall. In fact, there 
was a net $4 billion rise driven by tesobonos, which suggests that the reserve loss was financed 
by liquid peso holdings. For our present purposes, the most important observation is that the 
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attacks before the devaluation were directed against peso-denominated assets; i.e., that they 
were induced by currency risk or the expectation that there could be a discrete devaluation in 
the exchange rate. 
A third speculative attack came immediately after the devaluation announcement. The renewed 
turmoil was evident first of all in an exacerbation of the excess demand for dollars: in a few 
hours, the country lost nearly half of its remaining $10.6 billion in international reserves, which 
prompted the Banco de Mexico to withdraw from the foreign exchange market and let the peso 
float. A period of substantial depreciation followed: the dollar parity moved from about 4 pesos 
following the realignment to more than 7 pesos within little more than two months. 
One can ask what was the factor behind this negative market reaction to the devaluation. It 
seems difficult to argue that concerns about the size of nominal devaluation or its inflationary 
impact were .the driving force. This conclusion is supported by a number of indicators. Consider 
first the country's macroeconomic situation in late 1994. Not only was by then the annual 
inflation rate quite low (about 7%), but in addition there were no signs of over-heating (the 
average GDP growth rate for 1993-94 was 2.2%), and there was fiscal equilibrium. Thus there 
was no basis for expecting that a 15% exchange rate realignment would by itself cause a surge 
in domestic inflation, which could lead to a vicious circle of high inflation and devaluation. 
Moreover, before the devaluation real exchange rate depreciation expectations were quite 
moderate. To see this, consider the following open interest parity condition, which states that 
the expected peso return on dollar-indexed tesobonos and CPI-indexed ajustabonos must be 
equal, i.e., 
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where i is the annual interest rate, e the expected depreciation rate of the peso price of the 
dollar, p the expected inflation rate, and the superscripts denote the different types of bonds. 
From (1) it follows that the expected change in the real exchange rate (minus the expected 
foreign inflation rate) can be estimated as the interest rate differential between ajustabonos and 
tesobonos. 
Let us look at the monthly values of the interest differential for the period August 1993 through 
November 1994 (figure 3). Although the series fluctuates over time, it is evident that, overall, no 
major change in the real exchange rate was ever expected. Focusing on the periods with the 
greatest interest differentials (in relative value), i.e. late 1993 and mid 1994, and making 
reasonable allowance for expectations about the international inflation rate (mainly the U.S. 
rate, given the composition of Mexico's foreign trade), the expected real depreciation was quite 
small, not likely above 2.5% per year. This suggests that, at the time of devaluation, investors 
were willing to carry domestic debt in their portfolios under the premise of, at most, a slowly 
depreciating real exchange rate. 
Perhaps the most definitive piece of evidence cmpes from the type of portfolio shifts that 
accompanied the postdevaluation attack. A basic feature of the episodes of reserve loss before 
the devaluation was the enlargement of tesobono holdings; this portfolio recomposition reveals 
a desire by investors to cover from the possibility of a devaluation. In contrast, a prominent 
characteristic of the third attack was an attempt to shift away from tesobonos, which led to the 
collapse of tesobono auctions in late December (Folkerts-Landau et al 1995:5; see also Cole and 
Kehoe 1996, section 6). 
Thus, in retrospective it seems clear that the financial panic observed in Mexico in the final days 
of 1994 was in last instance induced, not by the parity change itself, but by a widely held 
perception that the authorities could be forced to default on part of the country's domestic debt, 
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a belief that led to a massive attempt by investors to shift from local to foreign assets. There was 
an objective basis for this behavior: in particular, at the time of devaluation, (a) there was an 
exceedingly high ratio of short-term, dollar-indexed debt to foreign exchange reserves, and (b) 
reserves were falling. Thus it was a likely event that the government could lack, in the very near 
future, the foreign exchange needed to repurchase even a small fraction of its debt from 
investors unwilling to roll it over. 
Consider the basic numbers. In February 1994, private holdings of domestic public debt were 
$45 billion, most of which corresponded to nominal, peso-denominated treasury bills (cetes and 
bondes). In the aftermath of the Colosio shock, debt holdings fell to about $34 billion, but 
remained roughly at that level for the remaining of the year. The currency composition of debt, 
in contrast, suffered a dramatic change, in that the share of tesobonos increased from (roughly) 
5% in February to 30% two months later. Essentially, this jump coincided with the speculative 
attack prompted by Colosio's assassination, during which there was, as we saw, an $11 billion 
loss in international reserves (figure 4). 
By late April the reserve drain had stopped, but expectations of a possible revision in exchange 
rate policy persisted --at least in a segment of investors--, as revealed by the steady rise of 
dollar-indexed tesobonos in private portfolios. In particular, the share of tesobonos in total 
domestic debt moved from 30% in April to 50% in August. This reveals a policy decision to 
keep the peso band unchanged and release pressure from the foreign exchange market, without 
losing reserves, by continuing the substitution of maturing peso debt by exchange rate indexed 
bills. Reserve drain resumed in the first days of November 1994. By then the share of tesobonos 
was quite high, yet the authorities insisted on the same strategy of defending the peg by shifting 
from peso to dollar debt: by the end of December, tesobonos represented about 70% of total 
domestic debt. 
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Central bank officials were fully aware of the policy dilemma the economy faced during most of 
1994. A rise in expected depreciation led to two options: (a) to accommodate expectations, or (b) 
to defend the peso band by a combination of exchange market intervention and rising interest 
rates. (a) was ruled out. Reserves were finite, however, while increasing the domestic interest 
rate would cause troubles to a banking sector which was already showing signs of distress. 
Facing the dilemma, the government opted for steadily indexing domestic debt to the nominal 
exchange rate, as a means of meeting the excess demand for dollar assets (Banco de Mexico, 
1994 Annual Report). 
It can be assumed that the Mexican authorities were hoping the pressure on the peso parity 
would eventually vanish. In the interim, however, they were assuming a very risky position, in 
that as the share of dollar-indexed debt rose, international reserves became increasingly 
insufficient to cover a possible run. In the end, the worst-case scenario developed. At the end of 
February, with international reserves of nearly $30 billion and only $2.5 billion's worth of 
dollar-indexed debt, the ratio of tesobonos to reserves was below 0.1. Things started to change 
within the next few months. First was the impact of March's political shock. As we saw, there 
was an immediate reserve drain exceeding $11 billion, and at the same time, although total 
domestic debt fell, the value of dollar-indexed debt increased to $10 billion because of a rise in 
the tesobono share. As a result, by the end of April the tesobono-reserve ratio was already 0.5. 
Still, for every dollar's worth of debt, there were two dollars in reserves (figure 5). 
In the following months, reserves stabilized but at the cost of continuously increasing the share 
of tesobonos. By the end of July the tesobono-reserve ratio was already equal to one; there were 
just enough reserves to face a run on domestic dollar debt. Then came the second episode of 
reserve loss, during which the central bank lost $7 billion (up to the time of devaluation) in 
foreign assets, while tesobono holdings kept rising. In this way, when the peso devaluation 
finally took place, the debt ratio was somewhere between 2.5 and 3; as a result of the 
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acceleration of reserve loss that followed the devaluation, the year closed with a relation of 
outstanding tesobonos to reserves of 3.5. Not only was the ratio extremely high, but the country 
was still losing reserves. Matters were further complicated by the antecedent of a reduction in 
the average maturity of domestic debt, which of course meant that investors could more rapidly 
try to shift from domestic assets, threaten by default risk, to foreign assets. 
In view of the situation, the surprising fact is not that a run on tesobonos (and peso-
denominated debt as well) eventually occurred, but that it took so long. Even more, the 
country's political risk premium, approximated by the interest rate differential between 
tesobonos and U.S. treasury bills, fell from 3.5 percentage points in May 1994 to less than 2 
points in the week before the devaluation. The whole situation changed as soon as the ceiling of 
the peso band was devalued. As we noted, there was an immediate acceleration in reserve 
drain, and in addition, after a protracted period of rising private holdings of tesobonos, the 
tesobono auctions suddenly collapsed. This was accompanied, as could be expected, by a shift 
in the political risk premium, which in the two weekly auctions following the devaluation 
jumped from less than 2 points to more than 2.5 and then to nearly 5 points (figure 6). 
It is evident, therefore, that in a very real sense the devaluation announcement triggered a run. 
Yet we have argued that initially the run was not caused by fears of further currency 
depreciation, but by political risk. In this respect, the parity change itself was immaterial, since 
by definition the ratio of dollar-indexed tesobonos to international reserves did not depend on 
the level of the exchange rate. If any, the effect of devaluation should have been positive, in that 
it tended to eliminated the real currency appreciation accumulated in the previous years and 
thus reduced the risk of future reserve loss. 
Thus the timing of the collapse of tesobono auctions raises a puzzle, which has not received 
proper attention in the literature. While the devaluation announcement triggered the panic, it 
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could not do so by its effect on the fundamentals of the situation. We would argue that its 
impact came, instead, from the information it conveyed to market participants. With the 
devaluation there was a sudden realization of the existence of a high political risk on domestic 
assets. Where did this realization come from? 
One possibility is that, with the realignment, investors became aware of the high proportion of 
tesobonos in total debt. This appears unlikely, however: first, because the Treasury had been 
periodically submitting to Congress information on the evolution of public debt, in which the 
rising share of tesobonos was explicitly mentioned [see El Mercado de Valores (MV) various 
issues, 1994; for reinforcing evidence, see Edwards 1997, p. 19]. But more importantly, because 
there is no reason to assume that a parity change would convey to market participants any 
implicit information about the composition of debt. If any, the effect should have been the 
opposite, given that with a stock of domestic debt mostly indexed to the dollar, the authorities 
had an incentive not to devalue, because of the concomitant rise in the peso value of debt. 
Assume instead that investors were receiving information about the Banco de Mexico's stock of 
international reserves with a considerable lag (say, a quarter), an assumption that seems to fit 
the actual situation in the country at the time (Folkerts-Landau et al 1996, and Klein and 
Coutino 1996). In such circumstances, at the close of 1994 market participants had data that 
reflected a (spuriously) stable level of central bank foreign assets. 
In this context of imperfect information came the devaluation announcement. For market 
participants, the most likely interpretation was that the central bank was being forced to 
devalue by the approaching of reserve exhaustion. The devaluation thus had a signaling effect, 
and in practice it had the impact of a reserve shock. With information "updated" in this way, 
the high risk of outright default or the imposition of exchange controls became clear to 
investors, and a financial run began. 
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3. The Mexican government strategy 
3.1 Basic ingredients 
The essence of the economic strategy followed by the Mexican government before the peso 
crisis of December 1994 was clearly stated at least since the late 1980s. The two basic elements 
were: (a) fiscal adjustment, and in general a macroeconomic policy stance which had the 
ultimate purpose of reducing domestic inflation to international levels; and (b) a program of 
structural reform encompassing trade liberalization, privatization of public assets and in 
general the deregulation of economic activity.{2} {3} 
The strategy was widely publicized by the government. For instance, in February 1990, 
President Salinas delivered a speech at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in 
which he summarized his Administration's policies as a combination of: (a) fiscal reform, (b) 
disinflation, (c) external debt renegotiation, (d) trade liberalization, and in particular 
participation in regional free trade agreements with the purpose of locking in the trade reform, 
(e) promotion of foreign direct investment through opening of new sectors and a favorable tax 
treatment, and (f) privatization (MV March 1990, #5). The same message was delivered by 
Salinas in October 1990 at the United Nations, and in July 1992 at the Paris offices of the OECD. 
As could be expected, the Mexican government emphasized these points in its communications 
to the IMF. For instance, in a letter of intention of January 1990 to the Fund, the Mexican 
authorities called attention to the rise in the primary fiscal surplus --from 6 to 8% of GDP--
registered during 1989, and the continuation of structural reforms in terms of promotion of 
foreign direct investment, privatization of public assets, trade opening, and deregulation of 
interest rates (MV 1990 #2). The same points were stressed in an April 1991 letter of intention. 
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In relation to the goals of macroeconomic policy, in the October 1992 pact renewal, for the first 
time authorities targeted a single digit level inflation rate for the following year. In his 
November 1992 address to Congress, president Salinas argued that price stability, meaning by 
that an inflation rate below 10%, was a condition for sustained economic growth. The Policy 
Criteria for 1993 set an inflation target of 7%, based as well on the claim that price stability was 
a necessary condition for steady growth. 
The issue was taken up again by Salinas in May 1993, when the initiative of constitutional 
reform to grant the Banco de Mexico full autonomy was submitted to Congress. There it was 
argued that high inflation rates represent a barrier to sustained growth, in that they produce 
negative changes in income distribution, a loss of efficiency in resource allocation, and low 
saving rates associated to low real interest rates (or alternatively low investment rates 
associated to the high interest rates demanded by savers to compensate for the inflationary 
risk). A similar analysis was put forward in the Policy Criteria for 1994. The inflation target for 
1994was 5%. 
3.2 Current account, growth deceleration and bank lending boom 
In section I it was argued that as disinflation proceeded and foreign capital inflows gained force 
during 1990-1991, signs of potentially serious macroeconomic problems emerged; essentially, 
these consisted of a sustained process of real currency appreciation, output growth deceleration, 
and high current account deficits associated to low private saving rates and a commercial bank 
lending boom. Initially, the dominant view within the government seems to have been the need 
to avoid a real appreciation of the peso in the course of disinflation. For example, in the January 
1990 letter of intention to the IMF referred to above, the Mexican authorities pointed out that 
the introduction of a one peso daily crawl rate was intended as a means to avoid losing 
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competitiveness (MV 1990 #2). Their concern for the future evolution of the current account is 
evident in the subsequent April 1991 letter, in which the government stated its expectation of a 
future rise in both public and private saving rates. 
Later on, however, what could have been considered as troublesome was instead interpreted as 
a positive outcome of current public policies. For instance, in its 1990 Annual Report (early 
1991), Banco de Mexico argued that the government's economic strategy, based on trade and 
financial deregulation and a stronger role of the private sector in the economy, was having a 
positive impact on private expectations, which materialized in a surge of capital inflows, 
growing exchange reserves and falling domestic interest rates, and would lead over time to 
higher investment and GDP growth. 
From the Bank's standpoint, the rising current account deficit did not represent by itself a 
problem for economic policy, given that it reflected, not a fiscal deficit, but an excess of private 
expenditure.{4} The same view was expressed by president Salinas in his November 1991 
address to Congress and in the Policy Criteria for 1992 (late 1991). At the time, the exchange rate 
band ceiling's daily crawl rate was set at 0.02 peso cents, a fall from the preceding crawling peg 
rate of 0.04 cents per day. The decision was justified by two considerations: first, the adoption of 
a single digit target for the inflation rate, and second, the strong rise in exports registered in the 
previous months and the overall surplus in the balance of payments (which was reflected in the 
expansion of international reserves). 
Banco de Mexico insisted on the same diagnosis in its 1991 Annual Report (early 1992). It was 
claimed that the sustained adoption of stabilization policies together with the advance 
registered in the program of structural reform (which during 1991 included privatization of 
banks, talks for a North American free trade area, financial liberalization --removal of liquidity 
coefficient for banks and of exchange controls--, and an initiative to reform the conditions of 
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land tenure in the rural sector) had resulted in an improvement of expectations in the private 
sector. On the question of whether the country faced a problem of currency overvaluation, the 
Bank remarked that the observed growth in real peso wages in the industry did not erode the 
country's competitiveness, because the wage rises were being accompanied by offsetting gains 
in labor productivity.{5} It was further argued that the surge in capital inflows would bring a 
growing supply of tradables in the future, and contribute in that way to reduce the current 
account deficit. The risk of a sudden reversal in capital inflows was acknowledged but, 
according to the Bank, the stability of the flows depended mainly on the government sticking to 
a set of consistent macroeconomic policies; finally, it was noted that, in the event of a reversal, 
the country had anyway enough exchange reserves to face it. 
Similar arguments were advanced by Salinas in his November 1992 address to Congress and in 
the Policy Criteria for 1993 (late 1992). It was again claimed that the rise in the current account 
deficit was not a matter of concern, for several reasons: (a) it was being generated by private 
borrowing, (b) exports were growing at a relatively high rate of 10%, (c) 85% of imports 
consisted of intermediate and capital goods that would further elevate exports in the future, 
and (d) exchange reserves were rising. In his address to Congress, the President attributed the 
observed deceleration in output growth to a combination of slower world output growth, 
transitory effects from the trade opening, and the impact of disinflationary fiscal, monetary and 
exchange policies. Essentially the same diagnosis was advanced by Salinas in his November 
1993 Congress address and in the Policy Criteria for 1994. Expectations were optimistic: with a 
3% GDP growth estimated for 1994, the current account deficit was expected to reach 5% of 
GDP (lower than the 5.4% in 1993), instead of the 7.9% actually registered. 
The Banco de Mexico's 1992 Annual Report (early 1993) addressed the issue of growth 
deceleration. Several factors were mentioned, among them the fall in world output growth and 
the "transitory" effect from heightened competition faced by domestic firms due to the 
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liberalization of trade. But in addition, the Bank called attention to existing uncertainty about 
whether NAFTA would be approved and, interestingly, to concerns about the high current 
account deficit; however, in the Bank's opinion, such concerns arose from "an insufficient 
analysis of the phenomenon" (MV 1993 #10:16). The fall in the domestic saving rate had as well 
been identified, and it was attributed to factors like the erosion in private spending during the 
eighties, a rise in permanent income due to an improvement in long term expectations, and 
greater real financial wealth in the private sector (particularly from stock holdings). The 
importance that the saving rate increased in the future was noted, in particular because that 
would keep the external deficit within certain bounds. For this purpose, " ... sustaining healthy 
public finances, monetary stability and an efficient financial system ... are indispensable ... " (MV 
1993 #10:22). 
Central banker Mancera took up the current account issue in an April 1993 analysis. He claimed 
that no single relationship exists between variations in the real exchange rate and a country's 
current account, and that given the observed rise in the Bank's exchange reserves, a reflection of 
an excess demand for pesos, it could be argued that the peso was in fact under-valued against 
the dollar (MV May 1993 #10:11).{6} The same diagnosis was advanced in the Bank's 1992 
Annual Report (early 1993). 
With respect to the observed behavior of private saving, Mancera noted the following in August 
1993: "the share of investment in GDP has grown from 16.1%in1987 to 21.7% in 1992 ... Total 
domestic saving has fallen from 22 to 16.3% of GDP ... despite a rise registered in public saving, 
which means a significant reduction in private saving, which I estimate to be temporal (MV 1993 
#17; my translation; emphasis added, p. 15). He argued that by itself the resulting current 
account deficit was not a problem, but that it could have a negative impact on private 
expectations. He dismissed the advisability of trying to modify the real exchange rate to affect 
the current account; in particular, he pointed out that exports were growing at 10% annually 
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and thus that there could not be a problem of misalignment (the same point was made in the 
1993 Annual Report, where the central bank noted that total exports --excluding oil-- grew 17% 
during 1993). The governor argued that the best way to reduce the deficit was to increase 
domestic saving (p. 18). Finally, a new (complementary) explanation for growth deceleration 
was proposed: lack of credibility in the disinflationary program was producing real wage rises 
larger than productivity improvements (thus raising domestic production costs), and high ex 
post real interest rates. Essentially the same explanation for lower economic growth was 
advanced in the Bank's 1993 Annual Report (April 1994), where it was argued that the 
deceleration would be temporary. 
As regards the commercial bank lending boom, the central bank stated in its 1990 Report that 
the rapid pace of financial deepening witnessed at the turn of the decade, with a 12.3% real 
growth rate for M4 during 1990, represented a positive development. The issue was taken up in 
the Policy Criteria for 1994 (late 1993). It was noted that the relation of M4 to GDP had risen 
from 35% in 1988 to an estimated 50% in 1993; in the same interval, aggregate lending to the 
private sector had increased 225% in real terms. This was deemed "a favorable evolution of 
financial markets ... as an outcome of reforms and sound public finances" (MV 1994 #2:16). A 
further 17% rise in real aggregate lending was expected for 1994. 
In its 1993 Annual Report, Banco de Mexico observed that during that year there had been a fall 
in the growth rate of bank lending, which had expanded 388% between end of 1988 and end of 
1992. Interestingly, the Bank attributed this deceleration in part to an erosion in the quality of 
assets in commercial banks' portfolios, which had led to a more cautious credit policy. In 
particular, there had been a rise in the ratio of delinquent loans from 5.3% in December 1992 to 
7.1 % in December 1993. It was considered, however, that this represented no serious risk for 
banks, because of existing high levels of capital and precautionary reserves, and because of the 
practice of grade rating of assets. It was also noted that there had been a deceleration in credit 
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demand because of a situation of over-indebtedness among some firms and individuals (MV 
1994 May #5:31). 
Finally, in his November 1994 Congress address, President Salinas insisted on the same 
diagnosis: the shift of total borrowing from 14% of GDP in 1988 to 39% in 1993, and the 18% 
annual growth rate in real lending between January and September 1994, were both signs of 
unqualified good economic performance 
3.3 Devaluation and crisis 
On 1 December 1994 a new government took office in Mexico, and soon afterwards --despite 
past assurances that the country's macroeconomic performance showed no signs of distress--
the peso was devalued. Perhaps the best way to understand the new Administration's decision 
to devalue, is to recall President Zedillo's words at the signature of the so called Acuerdo de 
Unidad para Superar la Emergencia Econ6mica (Agreement to Overcome the Economic 
Emergency, AUSEE) by labor unions, private firms and the federal government, on 3 January 
1995: 
"Mexico faces a severe economic problem ... coming from a significant current account deficit 
accumulated over several years and financed by short term private capital inflows. This deficit 
resulted in a situation of high vulnerability for the economy ... The economic program initially 
designed for 1995 had the goal of slowly reducing this vulnerability, by gradually adjusting the 
current account deficit ... A clear opportunity consists of freeing our economy from the burden 
of an overvalued exchange rate. This burden made it impossible to translate the structural 
change ... into more dynamic economic growth" (MV 1995 #2; 3, 6; my translation). 
24 
The same view was expressed by Secretary of the Treasury Guillermo Ortiz in an article which 
appeared in the 5 January 1995 issue of the Wall Street Journal. There he argued that the basic 
economic problem in Mexico was the existence of a high current account deficit, associated with 
an overvalued currency and an excessive growth in bank lending. In his opinion the economic 
program for 1995, anticipating a current account deficit of $31 billion, was deemed 
unsustainable by investors. 
These quotations show the fact that before the peso was devalued there was a change in 
diagnosis among top government officials regarding the implications of the currency 
appreciation, the current account deficit and the bank lending boom. 
The policy response to the post-devaluation panic initially consisted of an economic program 
(the AUSEE), whose main ingredients were (a) fiscal adjustment, further privatization and more 
opportunities for foreign investment in domestic banking, plus (b) the negotiation of an $18 
billion financial package with the U.S. The policy announcement failed to calm down financial 
markets, though, and on 9 March 1995 a new program, the so called PARAUSEE, was adopted. 
It involved a stronger fiscal adjustment, and a new program of bank capitalization, whereby so 
called FOBAPROA would absorb part of a bank's non performing loans. 
The impact of the stabilization program on investor sentiment is studied in section 6. Here we 
focus on the diagnosis presented in the program. According to the P ARAUSEE, the two basic 
factors behind the instability showed by financial markets in the aftermath of the devaluation 
were: (a) a process of world portfolio recomposition, consisting of a shift of funds from 
developing to developed countries, as a result of higher interest rates in the latter and 
perceptions of increased risk in the former; and (b) the uncertainty surrounding the negotiations 
with the IMF and the U.S. for an emergency financial package. Secretary Ortiz called attention 
to two additional factors, namely (c) the perception that the initial 15% shift in the band ceiling 
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was insufficient to correct the cumulative real appreciation, and (d) the possibility of default on 
tesobonos. {7} 
On the other side, it is interesting to note that Banco de Mexico insisted on its interpretation of 
the pre-devaluation events, even after the December crisis. For instance, in a February 1995 
analysis, Governor Mancera argued that (a) the high current account deficit was a temporary 
phenomenon that would disappear as ongoing investment projects began expanding the 
tradables sector production capacity, (b) the high dynamism of exports showed that there was 
no problem of currency overvaluation, and (c) the problem with the deficit was that investors 
became nervous about it. 
The same point was made in the Bank's 1994 Annual Report (early 1995), in which it was 
asserted that as long as the currency appreciation is accompanied by domestic productivity 
rises, there has to be no loss of competitiveness. This would have been exemplified by the case 
of Mexico, whose exports showed great dynamism before the devaluation. It went on to argue 
that "the stability of exchange reserves [between late April and early November] ... was 
evidence that at the prevailing exchange and interest rates ... the balance of payments was in 
equilibrium" (MV 1995 June #6:16){8}. The reduction in the capital account surplus during 1994 
was thus attributed to the political shocks at home and the rise in international interest rates. 
4. The IMF 
4.1 The IMF strategy 
With frequency, the IMF has argued that economic success for developing countries depends on 
their following a strategy that combines three basic elements: (a) sustained macroeconomic 
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adjustment, based on tight fiscal and monetary policies consistent with a low inflation rate; (b) 
structural reform, including trade liberalization, deregulation of financial markets, and 
privatization of public assets; and (c) for heavily indebted countries, external debt renegotiation. 
For instance, in his opening statement to the September 1990 Annual Meetings of the IMF and 
the World Bank, the Fund's Director, Michel Camdessus, asserted that "the more successful 
developing and industrial countries" have included (a) and (b) as a central part of their policy 
packages. The same point was made in the presentation to the October 1991 Meetings when 
talking about the lessons from the Asian experience of rapid economic growth; and in the 1992, 
1993 and 1994 Meetings when describing the key ingredients in the strategies of a group of 35 
successful developing countries. 
The importance of having dealt with the external debt problem, which will open "buoyant 
opportunities" for countries like Mexico, was mentioned by the Fund's Director in the October 
1991 meetings. In his concluding remarks, he went on to argue that there is "virtually 
unanimous agreement on what policies work ... -for dealing with debt, or for promoting 
development". Similarly, in the IMF's 1991 Annual Report it was claimed that the far-reaching 
structural reforms adopted in Mexico (among other countries), had resulted· in growth 
resumption, disinflation, and substantial capital inflows (p. 11); and in the 1992 Annual Report, 
it was argued that the re-entering of Mexico, among others, to the international capital market 
was "the market response to the sustained adoption of the right economic measures" (p. 50). 
The same perspective is found in analyses by the Fund's staff. For instance, in the May 1991 
issue of International Capital Markets it was argued that the basic pre-conditions for the re-
entry of heavily indebted developing countries to international capital markets consisted of the 
sustained adoption of adjustment policies, structural reform and the restructuring of 
commercial bank debt (pp. 13, 69). This was exemplified by the recent case of Mexico (p. 14); in 
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particular," ... the trading volume for claims on Mexico [in the secondary market] is reported to 
have risen substantially following the completion of its debt-restructuring agreement in early 
1990" (p. 81). 
The May 1992 World Economic Outlook attributed the observed rise in the pace of economic 
growth in Mexico, among a group of developing countries, to a strategy consisting of "reforms 
in macroeconomic policies, trade liberalization, economic deregulation, and the privatization of 
public enterprises ... " (pp. 9, 36). The same ingredients for stabilization and growth were singled 
out in the May 1993 Outlook (p. 6) and in the October 1993 issue (p. 7), which explicitly 
commended the policies adopted by the governments of Chile, Mexico and Argentina.{9} 
The October 1994 Outlook devoted an entire section to the analysis of the surge in capital flows 
to developing countries. It concluded that foreign investment in Mexico, among other countries, 
was being attracted by the programs of fiscal adjustment and structural reform (financial 
deregulation, privatization, tax reform, trade liberalization). In fact, "capital inflows to Mexico 
in the early 1990s were undoubtedly stimulated by the initiation of negotiations for the NAFTA, 
which was eventually signed in 1993" (p. 55). 
4.2 Mexico falling short 
It is immediately clear that there was a broad coincidence between the policies applied in 
Mexico and those recommended by the IMF. It is no surprise, then, that from the Fund's 
standpoint, the positive change in market sentiment toward the country was justified by a shift 
in fundamentals. It should be noted as well, however, that there were important differences 
between expected and actual results of the pursued policies. These concerned aspects of 
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economic performance for which information was available and which turned out to be 
important in the eruption of the crisis. 
There was, in the first place, the issue of the real exchange rate. Both in Camdessus's remarks 
and in the staff reports, there was a continuous stress on the need to maintain a viable level for 
the exchange rate. For instance, in the 1992 Annual Meetings, the Fund's Director included a 
"realistic exchange rate" among the key determinants of good economic performance (p. 18). He 
made the same point in the 1993 Meetings (p. 22), and went on the mention that the recent 
experience of EMU (making implicit reference to the currency crises of the early nineties) 
showed that "credibility also depends on consistency between economic policies on the one 
hand and the country's economic performance and domestic requirements on the other" (p. 24; 
for the same point, see the World Economic Outlooks for May 1992 --pp. 26-28-- and May 1993 -
-p. 6--).{10} 
In the second place, there was always an emphasis on the need to promote domestic saving. For 
instance, in his analysis of the Asian experience, Camdessus claimed that an important 
ingredient was "sustained high rates of saving allowing substantial productive investment..." 
(p. 15; the same point was made in the May and October 1993 Outlooks --pp. 6, and 8 and 69, 
respectively). It is interesting in this respect the observation in the October 1994 Outlook that 
among recipients of reavy capital flows in Latin America, the investment ratio had remained 
constant. Although not mentioned, this had the direct implication that the inflows and 
accompanying current account defici~s of the early 1990s had led to lower saving rates. The 
Fund called attention to some exceptions, including Mexico (p. 57). But then there is a sharp 
contrast between pre- and post-crisis assessments; for example, in the May 1995 Outlook, it was 
commented again that in Latin America, as opposed to most developing countries in Asia, the 
period of heavy capital inflows was accompanied by a very slightly rising investment rate and a 
strongly declining saving rate (p. 46). 
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A third issue concerned the heavy capital inflows registered in the early 1990s in a number of 
Latin American countries. For the Fund, it was clear that the current account deficits in 
countries like Mexico did not have a fiscal origin. It was noted, however, that the "future 
sustainability [of the capital inflows] was not necessarily assured" (p. 26). This represented a 
potential problem. The difficulties posed by the inflows were also clearly stated: they generate 
inflationary pressures, induce sharp rises in consumption and asset prices, and may result in 
real currency appreciation (October 1992 Outlook, p. 39). The same point was made by 
Camdessus himself in his opening statement to the 1993 Annual Meetings: the return of private 
capital to developing economies was a reward for macroeconomic adjustment and structural 
reform, but he added, first, that this did not obviate the need to promote national saving, and 
second, that prudence was necessary in facing the inflows, which bring with them "pressures 
and risks" (p. 22). 
In fourth place we may mention the lessons from the banking difficulties of some developed 
countries in the early nineties. A first point, discussed in the August 1993 issue of International 
Capital Markets, has to do with the typical behavior of the banking sector before a crisis. There 
was a recognition that the increased competitive pressures brought about by a policy of 
financial liberalization represent an incentive for banks to involve in riskier activities (p. 3). 
Moreover, the experience of a group of developed economies during 1991-92 showed a pattern 
of "sharp expansion in bank lending relative to nominal GDP ... '; after financial liberalization as 
a prelude to banking problems (p. 4). 
In light of this evidence, a second lesson is that, "the supervisory and regulatory framework 
must remain strong and evolve along with the evolution of markets themselves if their integrity 
... is to be preserved" (International Capital Markets, September 1992, p. 1). Similarly, in the 
October 1992 Outlook it was noted that financial sector reform (e.g., removal of interest rate and 
credit controls) must go accompanied by an update in legal and accounting systems, 
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enforcement of laws regarding collateral and foreclosure, and strong prudential regulation and 
supervision (p. 41); finally, in the October 1994 Outlook it was mentioned that, following 
massive capital inflows, banking systems with distortions, "inadequate supervision and 
prudential standards could lead banks to engage in excessively risky lending behavior" (p. 60). 
Given the record of Mexico in these four points, it is obvious that the country was falling short 
of meeting a number of key indicators of economic performance, and therefore there arises the 
question of why did the country consistently receive such positive assessments in the Fund's 
reports, right up to the crisis. The Fund was well aware of the country's external situation: in 
the October 1994 Outlook it was noted that there had been a rise in the current account deficit, 
as share of GDP, from 3.25% in 1990 to an estimated 6.5% in 1994 (p. 31). Moreover, even before, 
in the August 1993 issue of International Capital Markets, the reduction in spontaneous 
financing to LDCs together with the erosion in terms registered in the second half of 1992, was 
attributed to a change in investor attitudes which could be related to "the wide external current 
account deficits in Argentina and Mexico ... " (p. 60). 
The consistently positive assessments may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the 
policies applied in Mexico followed closely the IMF's recommendations. For instance, in the 
October 1992 Outlook higher economic growth in Mexico was attributed to reforms in 
macroeconomic policies, trade liberalization, economic deregulation, and the privatization of 
public enterprises, along with the external debt renegotiation (p. 36). Given this agreement on 
the overall orientation of policies, it became possible to argue that the process of real currency 
appreciation observed in Mexico was justified by fundamentals and thus represented no policy 
concern; or that although there had been a fall in the saving rate, there had been as well a 
modest rise in the investment rate (October 1994 Outlook, p. 57); or that although growth was 
sluggish, this would be a short-lived phenomenon (October 1994 Outlook, p. 15); or that, in 
general, the success of the exchange rate policy depended, not on whether the rate was fixed o 
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flexible, but on the adoption of prudent fiscal and monetary policies (October 1994 Outlook, p. 
28). 
The ambiguity sometimes present in Fund's analyses is shown in the following two 
examples{ll}: first, in an analysis of the phenomenon of massive capital inflows to developing 
countries, it was claimed that in most cases receiving countries had shown strong economic 
growth or were expected to do so because of their current policies (October 1994 Outlook, p. 6). 
Second, when analyzing the risks posed by massive capital inflows, it was argued that "[i]n 
general, the most appropriate response appears to be fiscal restraint, which can limit the 
pressure on interest rates, and the risk of inflation" (October 1993 Outlook, p. 41). On these 
criteria, Mexico would pass the test, in particular as the country's inflation approached single 
digit levels. But then it is noted that "[a] real exchange rate appreciation may not be appropriate 
for countries that already have an unsustainable large current account deficit or for which the 
widening of the deficit reflects a fall in. domestic saving instead of a rise in investment." (p. 80). 
4.3 The peso crisis 
The initial official response of the IMF to the Mexican crisis was to label it as a crisis of a new 
kind. In late 1995, Camdessus pointed out what in his view were the main lessons to be learnt. 
In particular, developing countries should: (a) keep tightly disciplined macroeconomic policies, 
(b) manage carefully massive capital inflows, which should not become a substitute of national 
saving, and (c) establish domestic financial sectors which are "sound, well regulated, and 
properly supervised" (Presentation, 1995 Annual Meetings, p. 29). In the IMF's 1995 Annual 
Report, it is further noted that: (a) the Mexican authorities did not provide the Fund with key 
information before the crisis; and (b) the Fund surveillance was not completely effective in 
warning Mexico about the risks present in a "system of fixed parity" (pp. 51-2; Spanish version). 
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The May 1995 Outlook reflected that in Mexico repeated episodes of reserve loss had forced the 
authorities to devalue the peso, which in turn resulted in a "severe confidence crisis". It was 
argued that reserves had declined because of (a) concerns about the high level of the country's 
current account deficit, and (b) the political shocks of 1994 (p. 2). It was observed as well that 
the current account deficit was in part the result of a fall in the domestic saving rate, financed 
by a surge in capital inflows (p. 47). The report concluded that the Mexican experience made 
clear the limits to the viability of external disequilibria and currency appreciation, and in 
particular it showed the risks associated with having a very low rate of domestic saving (p. 7). 
In the October 1995 Outlook it was observed that the Mexican authorities responded to the 
crisis with a stabilization program featuring "a significant improvement in the fiscal situation"; 
the goals were to increase domestic saving, reduce the current account deficit and stop inflation. 
It mentioned that the initial results, including a rising stock exchange index, falling local interest 
rates and exchange rate stability, suggested that the program had been successful (p. 9). 
Two issues are immediately raised by the IMF's analysis. The first one is that it is consistent 
with the policy analyses and recommendations made by the Fund well before the Mexican peso 
crisis, in which there was a permanent emphasis on the need to tightly conduct fiscal and 
monetary policies and to promote high rates of local saving, and the risks posed by massive 
capital inflows and booming banking lending. Hence the idea that the Mexican was a crisis with 
no precedent does not seem warranted, according to the Fund's own criteria. 
The second ques~on is that the Fund apparently never saw developments in Mexico as cause of 
serious concern. In this respect, it would be misleading to argue that there was a problem of 
insufficient information. As we saw, the staff knew about the steep rise in the current account 
deficit before the 1994 and a tendency toward economic deceleration; it surely was not 
particularly difficult to find out that the rise in the deficit was not fully matched by a rise in 
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domestic investment. Of course, it was always known that Mexico was among the main 
recipients of private capital in the developing world, largely in the form of bond and equity 
investments. And the Mexican authorities themselves proudly called attention to figures that 
showed a boom in the domestic banking sector well before the crisis. Information was publicly 
available on the increasing share of dollar-indexed tesobonos in domestic debt (Edwards 1997). 
In light of this, a likely lesson is that, in the midst of financial euphoria, knowledge of the state 
of fundamentals (even if there is agreement on what the set of relevant fundamentals is) is not 
enough to prevent a crisis, a conclusion that runs counter a widely held opinion that the crisis 
was caused by the existence of poorly informed investors. 
5. Investor sentiment and policy credibility 
In this section we take a first look at the way investor sentiment evolved in Mexico before, 
during and immediately after the peso crisis. We consider three basic indicators: capital flows, 
interest rate spreads and, derived from these, the degree of exchange rate policy credibility. 
3.1 Capital flows 
In the first years of the nineties there was a dramatic change in investor sentiment toward 
Mexico, as revealed by the behavior of international capital flows. The turning point was 1990, 
when foreign investment increased from an annual average of $3.7 billion in 1988-89, to $6 
billion. After that, there was a steady rise in private capital inflows, which shifted from $17.5 
billion in 1991 to $33.3 billion in 1993 (figure 7). 
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As part of this trend, foreign direct investment increased from $3.2 billion in 1989 to $4.4 billion 
in 1993. Portfolio investment, however, was by far the most dynamic component, growing from 
$0.4 billion to $28.9 billion. This reflected an increase of investments in the stock exchange, from 
$0.5 billion in 1989 to $10.7 billion in 1993; in peso-denominated bonds, from zero to $7.4 billion; 
and in foreign-currency-denominated bonds, from minus $0.1 billion to $10.8 (figure 8). 
The situation during 1994 is worth looking at. During the first three quarters, foreign 
investment continued flowing into the country, albeit at a slightly slower pace: the quarterly 
average was $7.6 billion, below the corresponding $8.3 billion figure for 1993. The deceleration 
was caused by the behavior of portfolio flows, which in quarterly average fell from $7.2 billion 
during 1993 to $4.6 billion during the first three quarters of 1994; direct investment, in contrast, 
rose from $1.1 billion to $3.1 billion. The reduction of portfolio investment concentrated in the 
market for peso assets: peso bond investments fell from a quarterly average of $1.9 billion in 
1993 to $0.8 billion up to September 1994, while stock exchange investments declined from 2.7 
billion to 1.5 billion dollars in the same period. In contrast, foreign-currency bond investments 
shifted from 2.7 to 2.3 billion dollars, a much smaller reduction. 
These figures suggest that as the December 1994 devaluation approached, there was some 
erosion in exchange rate policy credibility, prompting some individuals to reduce their 
investments in peso-denominated financial assets. It seems important to stress, however, that 
capital inflows turned negative only after the devaluation, which would show that there was a 
segment of investors who were willing to invest in Mexican assets even in the months 
preceding the December crisis. On the other hand, the strong expansion in foreign direct 
investment implies that, beyond the possibility of currency realignment, the medium term 
outlook for the Mexican economy remained positive. This insight is reinforced by the behavior 
of capital flows during and after the peso crisis. 
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During the crisis, capital inflows of course collapsed. Foreign investment in the fourth quarter 
of 1994 and the first of 1995 was minus $9.2 billion. The massive outflow stopped in the second 
quarter of 1995, when foreign investment totaled minus $0.9 billion. Positive investment flows 
restarted in the third quarter of 1995; for the second half of the year, total investment was $6.1 
billion, and the figure for the entire 1996 was $22.6 billion. 
There was a sharp contrast in the evolution of direct and portfolio investment. The former 
remained positive throughout the period, totaling $9.2 billion in 1994 (with $1.7 billion in the 
last quarter of 1994), $9.5 billion in 1995 and $9.2 billion in 1996. In contrast, cumulative 
portfolio investment during the last quarter of 1994 and the first of 1995 was minus $12.9 billion. 
During the second quarter of 1995 there was still an outflow of $3.8 billion. After a negative 
investment of $0.2 billion in the third quarter, capital started flowing in again in the final 
quarter of the year, with an investment of $1.7 billion. Interestingly, investments in the stock 
exchange fell mainly in the fourth quarter of 1994 (minus $0.4 billion); afterwards, capital flows 
were slightly positive ($0.5 billion for the entire 1995). Thus it was basically investment in peso-
denominated debt which accounts for the capital outflows observed in late 1994 and during 
1995. In particular, from the fourth quarter of 1994 through the last of 1995 there was a 
cumulative outflow of $17.6 billion. Investment in foreign-currency-denominated debt was 
minus $3.8 billion between the fourth quarter of 1994 and the second of 1995; afterwards, there 
were again positive capital inflows. 
3.2 Spreads 
The evolution of spreads on Mexican debt reinforces one point just made, namely, the 
turnabout in investor sentiment toward Mexico at the start of the nineties. For instance, in the 
September 1992 issue of the IMF's International Capital Markets it was observed that the 
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phenomenon of improved terms of financing had been "most apparent in Mexico", where for 
instance "yield spreads at issue on unsecured Mexican public sector bonds fell further during 
the course of 1991, to ari average of 228 basis points during the second half of the year, a 
reduction of 40 percent compared with the spread of 1990" (p. 40). Besides this, "the initial 
maturity of public unsecured bond issues lengthened from an average of 3.8 years during the 
second half of 1990 to an average of 5.7 years during the second half of 1991" (p. 40). There was 
in addition a rise in the secondary market price of bank claims, with the average for Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela moving from 40% of face value in early 1990 to nearly 80% by mid 1992 
(p. 43, chart 8). 
In the August 1993 issue of International Capital Markets, it was noted that Standard and Poor's 
had assigned a AA+ rate to Mexican treasury bills (cetes) in November 1992 (p. 53). Moreover, 
in the September 1994 issue, it was mentioned that "in January, the market was anticipating that 
Standard & Poor's would upgrade Mexico from the highest subinvestment grade rating ... to the 
lowest investment grade rating ... As a result, the spread on Mexican sovereign issues fell to 
about 150 basis points, before the current market correction pushed the spread back to about 
200 basis points" (p. 90). Note that this report was issued only three months before the 
December devaluation. Consider as well the view expressed by J.P. Morgan in late 1994: "we 
view Mexico as investment-rate risk. We do not regard Mexican debt to have predominantly 
speculative characteristics" (quoted by Edwards 1997, p. 7). Taking a longer view, the IMF 
report observed that "since 1989, Mexico has consistently paid the lowest spread of the major 
Latin American borrowers; the spread fell to below 200 basis points after NAFTA was approved 
in November 1993" (p. 90). 
Thus it is clear that in the early years of the 1990s there was a positive shift in investor 
sentiment. We also see that in the eve of the crisis investor attitudes in at least a segment of the 
market remained positive. It is interesting to recall as well that in the first three quarters of 1994 
37 
there was still positive foreign investment in peso-denominated debt, while simultaneously 
some investors steadily shifted from cetes to tesobonos. This suggests that there was a 
segmentation of expectations among investors, with some of them shifting from peso to dollar 
denominated assets, even as others (including some foreigners) kept increasing their holdings 
of peso bonds. 
3.3 Exchange rate policy credibility 
As was already mentioned, during 1991-94 exchange rate policy in Mexico took the form of a 
sliding peso band against the U.S. dollar, with the band's floor fixed from November 1991 
onward and the ceiling's crawl rate periodically revised in the renewal of the disinflationary 
pacts. As is well known, under conditions of free capital mobility and risk neutrality, 
depreciation expectations can be obtained from a domestic peso-dollar interest rate differential. 
However, given that we are interested in measuring policy credibility, instead of depreciation 
expectations per se, we have to adjust the differential for the peso depreciation within the band. 
Thus our procedure involves the following steps (see Svensson 1991): first, we estimate the 
expected peso depreciation from the arbitrage condition that the expected return on peso-
denominated cetes and dollar-indexed tesobonos be equal, i.e., 
(2) 
where 1dm is the expected m-day depreciation rate on t, S1 the spot exchange rate (peso price of 
the dollar), 1S1+m them-term expected exchange rate, i* and i the annualized m-day tesobono and 
cete interest rates, respectively, and n = m/365. Next, using the official crawl rate, we can 
compute the maximum depreciation rate compatible with the band, defined as the difference 
between the announced ceiling and the current exchange rate, 
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(3) 
where td-m is the maximum m-day depreciation rate to be allowed within the band as oft, S-t 
is the current band ceiling, and ex. is the daily crawl rate (in pesos). Finally, to measure the 
degree of policy credibility, we subtract the maximum depreciation compatible with the band 
from the expected depreciation rate and obtain what we call the excess expected depreciation 
rate: 
(4) 
clearly, a positive x value would be a reflection of a less than fully credible exchange rate band. 
In the estimation of (2) the shortest interest rates available were used (28-day rates through mid 
1992, and 91-day rates thereon) in order to minimize any possible distortions arising from 
expectations of capital gains. Figure 9 presents the weekly series for td365 and td-365 • From the 
figure it is clear that strong changes in expectations took place over time. We may note, in 
particular, the rapid increase in the annual expected depreciation rate during most of 1992 
(reaching a 14% peak by the end of the year), the subsequent fall to 4% in early 1994, and finally 
the discrete increase in the interest differential that followed the assassination of Colosio in 
March 1994. 
Note as well the steady rise in the maximum depreciation rate, up to a 12.5% peak before the 
political shock. This gradual improvement in the band's strength came from two sources: a) the 
higher crawl rate introduced in October 1992, and b) the stabilization of the exchange rate, 
which resulted in an increasing gap between the actual rate and the band ceiling. As was noted 
before, this latter factor can be explained, at least for the period before the November 1993 
ratification of Nafta, by the existence of a narrow band within which the Banco de Mexico 
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intervened on a daily basis (see Schwartz 1994). Given the magnitude of capital inflows during 
the period, it seems plausible to assume that without intervention the exchange rate would have 
appreciated in nominal terms. The increase in the maximum depreciation rate would have been 
stronger. 
Figure 10 presents the weekly series for X365, whose behavior reflects the joint effect of variations 
in the expected depreciation rate and in the position of the exchange rate within the band. We 
may note: 
a) The steady erosion in credibility during most of 1992 (with X365 peaking at 10% in October), 
followed by a sustained improvement between late 1992 .and early 1994, that led to a situation 
of full credibility (X365<0) by mid 1993. Taking into consideration the information in figures 9 
and 10, it can be seen that full policy credibility in Mexico was the combined outcome of: (i) a 
steady fall in the expected depreciation rate, (ii) the October 1992 rise in the band's crawl rate, 
and (iii) the stabilization of the actual exchange rate, which resulted in the rate steadily shifting 
toward the strong (lower) half of the band. 
b) The 14 point upward jump after the political shock of March 1994, raising X365 to 6% by early 
April. Expectations stabilized rapidly, though, and there was a relatively low X365 value (2.5%) 
just before the December devaluation. This apparent recovery in credibility was notable for the 
conditions in which it took place, namely, a substantial cumulative currency appreciation and 
the uncertain political environment of 1994. 
In assessing this numbers, it is equally important to recall that after March 1994 there was a 
steady currency recomposition of domestic debt, by which cetes were increasingly substituted 
by tesobonos. This means that the prevailing cete-tesobono interest rate differential was not 
reflecting accurately the actual changes registered in depreciation expectations; what was 
40 
happening was that those investors with the highest expected depreciation were leaving the 
cete market, and this tended to reflect a spurious improvement in policy credibility. If we recall 
the evolution of foreign investment during 1994, the possibility becomes clear that the relatively 
low interest rate differential existing before the devaluation reflected mainly the exchange rate 
expectations of foreign investors. 
The cete rate skyrocketed after the devaluation. After registering an annual level of 15% in 
December 1994 (and less than 14% before the devaluation), the annualized 28-day rate jumped 
to 37.7% in January 1995, 42.4% in February, 70.7% in March and peaked at 74.9% in April. 
Afterwards it started descending. For the rest of the year, the average rate was 44.7%, while for 
1996 it was 31.3%. 
6. Shocks to investor sentiment 
We now take a more detailed look at the evolution of interest rate differentials as an indicator of 
changes in market sentiment, and relate it to the possible influence of different shocks that 
affected the Mexican economy during our period. 
Our first indicator is the annual interest rate on 28-day treasury bills (cetes). As was mentioned, 
a first positive shock came in the late eighties with the introduction of the new disinflationary 
program embodied in the pacts. The initial pact was signed in December 1987. The previous 
months had been of a rising interest rate in the context of accelerating inflation. In particular, 
the cete rate had increased from 90% in October 1987 to 123% only two months later, with the 
annual inflation rate closing the year at 132%, after increasing steadily in the preceding months. 
Perceptions of the likely success of the new disinflationary strategy quickly showed in the level 
of the interest rate. After peaking at 158% in January 1988, the cete rate rapidly fell to 40% by 
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June of that same year. Domestic inflation also declined, but at a slower pace; it was not until 
late in the year that the inflation rate fell to levels near 40% (figure 11). 
After this first stage of very rapid disinflation, there came a second period characterized by 
stable, for a while even slightly rising inflation; in particular, the annual rate remained slightly 
above 20% from mid 1989 through late 1991. In contrast, the cete rate experienced significant 
variation, falling from about 50% when President Salinas announced in mid 1989 the conclusion 
of the renegotiation of the country's commercial bank debt, to 16% by the time the peso band 
was announced in November 1991 (figure 12). A casual look at the series strongly suggests 
private expectations, as reflected in the cete rate, were positively influenced by the debt 
renegotiation announcement, the initiative to privatize domestic banks --sent to Congress by 
Salinas in May 1990--, the recommendation made by the Mexican Senate in June of that same 
year to seek a free trade agreement with the U.S. and the European Union, and the anticipation 
of the beginning of talks toward a free trade agreement with the U.S. mentioned in the Policy 
Criteria for 1991 (late 1990). 
A third stage in economic policy started with the introduction of an explicit band with fixed 
floor and depreciating ceiling in November 1991. Given the availability of information, here we 
can incorporate into the analysis the behavior of the interest rate on dollar-indexed tesobonos, 
which enables us, as explained in the previous section, to extract an indicator of depreciation 
expectations among investors. The actual exchange rate was quite stable from November 1991 
through March 1994, fluctuating around a value of 3.1 pesos per dollar. The stability of the 
exchange rate had the consequence of yielding a growing gap between the rate and the band 
ceiling; this offered room for absorbing negative shocks to the parity without having to revise 
the previously announced policy. In particular, the maximum depreciation consistent with the 
band increased from an annual rate of less than 3% in late 1991 to more than 12% in March 1994. 
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As was shown in the previous section, the expected depreciation rate implicit in the cete-
tesobono interest rate differential fell from 8% per year when the parity was allowed to 
fluctuate within the band, to 4% in late February 1992, and then increased steadily up to 14% in 
August 1992. Regarding the excess expected depreciation, which as we argued provides a more 
accurate measure of the degree of policy credibility, the annual rate fell from more than 4% in 
late 1991 to virtually zero in late February 1992 and then increased up to 10% by August 1992. 
The sequence suggests that the introduction of a new strategy of exchange rate management 
had a immediate positive impact on policy credibility. During most of 1992, however, there was 
a strong erosion in investor sentiment regarding the sustainability of the exchange rate policy. 
The source of this erosion is not immediately clear. One clue comes from the behavior of the 
interest differentials afterwards. In particular, in August 1992 President Salinas announced the 
conclusion of NAFTA negotiations with the U.S. and Canada, and in December of that year the 
agreement was signed. After these announcements, there was a change in the behavior of 
expectations, and in particular the excess expected depreciation rate entered a period of steady 
fall. Thus by mid 1993 there was full policy credibility. 
Before the assassination of presidential candidate Colosio in March 1993, expected depreciation 
was about 4% and excess expected depreciation was minus 8%. This trend may have been 
reinforced by the initiative to grant full autonomy to the Banco de Mexico, sent to Congress by 
President Salinas in May 1993, by the U.S. Senate ratification of NAFTA in November of that 
year, and by the announcement by President Salinas that joining the OECD was being seriously 
considered Ganuary 1994) (figures 9 and 10). 
The relevance of the free trade agreement for market sentiment is evidenced by the behavior of 
the interest rate differentials just before the ratification. As doubts about the result of the Senate 
vote heightened, the expected depreciation rate jumped up by 2 points in a matter of days, 
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while simultaneously the exchange rate increased above the band's central parity for the first 
time in nearly one year. As a result, the excess expected depreciation increased by nearly 5 
points. These changes were quickly reversed after the U.S. Senate vote, and the rate of excess 
expected depreciation fell from 2 to minus 4%. This clearly shows the importance investors 
attached to NAFTA, and thus it suggests that the erosion in policy credibility during most of 
1992 may have been related to doubts about the final result of the ongoing free trade 
negotiations, doubts which were dispelled in August of that year. At the time (i.e., immediately 
after the ratification), observing the behavior of domestic financial markets, a similar view was 
expressed by analysts at Banco Nacional de Mexico (Banamex) --one of the two largest banks in 
the country-- in their monthly analysis of the evolution of the Mexican economy (Banamex, 
January 1994). 
The positive trend in policy credibility was interrupted by the Colosio murder of March 1994. 
Immediately, the exchange rate shifted to the band ceiling --which produced a reduction in the 
maximum depreciation allowable within the band, from more than 12% to less than 5% in 
annual terms--, while the cete-tesobono differential moved from about 3% to more than 10%. As 
a result of both _changes, the excess expected depreciation shifted from minus 8% to a 6% peak 
(i.e., a 14 point shift in a matter of weeks). The effect of the Colosio shock is also shown by the 
interest rate differential between tesobonos and U.S. Treasury bills; this differential, which can 
be interpreted as an indicator of the country risk premium, increased from an average of less 
than 2% in March to about 3.5% two months later (figure 6).{12} 
In the months following Colosio's assassination, interest rate differentials remained high. The 
presidential elections of August 1994 became a turning point. Immediately after the victory of 
the ruling party's new candidate, Ernesto Zedillo, was known, the cete-tesobono differential fell 
from 10% to 6%; in addition, the exchange rate appreciated toward the band's central parity; as 
a result, excess expected depreciation declined, reaching for moments a zero level, and in 
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general it remained well below the high values observed in the wake of March's shock. Thus it 
appears that the election results reassured market participants of the continuation of the 
economic policies followed by the Salinas administration, which resulted in a lessening of 
devaluation expectations. It is finally interesting to note that the country risk premium began 
declining well before the presidential election. In June, the premium was already less than 3%, 
down from its 3.5% May peak. There was as well, however, a discernible effect from the election 
results. In particular, the average tesobono-U.S. treasury bill differential for August declined to 
2%, a level which persisted until the peso devaluation of December (figure 6).{13} 
It may be of interest to note that prevailing views in the banking sector were very similar to 
those of the Executive and the central bank. For instance, according to analyses by the staff of 
Banamex, the long-term outlook for the Mexican economy was strong because of the 
government's program of structural reform and fiscal adjustment, which was not altered by 
Colosio's assassination. Moreover, they fully shared the view that there was no need of a 
revision in exchange rate policy since there was no evidence of currency misalignment. Quite to 
the contrary: there was sustained growth in labor productivity and exports, and the current 
account deficit --instead of being the result of fiscal imbalances as has been in the past-- was a 
reflection of enhanced business opportunities in the country which were attracting large 
amounts of foreign investment (Banamex May 1994, June 1994). This was a position kept right 
up to December 1994 (Banamex November 1994, December 1994). 
A new stage was opened by the peso devaluation of 20 December 1994. We already discussed 
that despite the fact the Mexican economy had a problem of real currency over-valuation, the 
devaluation announcement produced a markedly negative market reaction: the reserve drain at 
the central bank accelerated and the country risk premium increased by 3 points in two weeks. 
After Banco de Mexico withdrew from the foreign exchange market and the peso began to float, 
there was strong currency depreciation together with steeply rising peso interest rates. As we 
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have argued, the evidence suggests that these events were not related to the parity change itself, 
but to a sudden perception of high political risk due to the possibility of the government 
defaulting on its dollar-linked tesobono debt. It may therefore be revealing of the way private 
expectations in the financial sector are formed to note that, before the devaluation, the 
introduction of tesobonos was regarded by some as positive. For instance, again focusing on 
analyses by the staff of Banamex, it was noted that the substitution of cetes by tesobonos was a 
means of protecting international reserves, putting downward pressure on peso interest rates 
and reducing the fiscal cost of government debt. There is not a single mention of the potential 
risks involved in issuing indexed debt (Banamex, September 1994). 
By mid March 1995 the foreign exchange market was already in calm, while the cete interest 
rate peaked (at an average of 75%) in April. The process of market reassurance involved two 
steps: the elimination of concerns about the possibility of adoption of capital controls, which 
could be forced on the Mexican authorities by the maturing of dollar-indexed tesobonos in a 
context of very low dollar reserves; and the introduction of a highly restrictive macroeconomic 
policy package. The sequence was as follows. As just mentioned, the initial period of floating 
witnessed a steep peso depreciation in the midst of a financial panic; on January 30 the 
exchange rate closed at a record-high level of 6.2 pesos per dollar. An initial attempt at calming 
down the markets by means of the AUSEE had failed; it seems likely that this happened, at least 
in part, because of existing doubts about whether the U.S. Congress would approve a $18 billion 
financial package for Mexico. A break came with the U.S. government announcement, on 
January 31, of a $50 billion package of debt guarantees that effectively removed concerns about 
the possibility of default on tesobonos. Notably, in the course of that very same day, the 
exchange parity recovered to 5.7 pesos. 
The relief was temporary, however, and within a month heavy speculation resumed. In the first 
nine days of March, as anticipations of a new economic program were being shaped, the parity 
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depreciated nearly 30%, closing at 7.3 pesos per dollar. The Mexican government then 
announced a severely restrictive macroeconomic program for the remaining of 1995 (the 
PARAUSEE). 
The changing outlook and policy restrictions for 1995 as the crisis evolved can be clearly 
appreciated in the following figures: the original Policy Criteria for 1995 considered a 4% GDP 
growth rate and a 5.4% inflation rate; in contrast, the respective figures in the AUSEE were 1.5% 
and 16%, and in the PARAUSEE minus 2% and 30%. The goal was to reduce the current account 
deficit from 7.9% of GDP in 1994 to 9.4% in 1995 in the original Criteria, to 4.2% in the AUSEE 
and to 0.9% in the PARAUSEE. This would be accomplished by (a) a rise in the primary fiscal 
surplus from 2.3% of GDP in 1994, to 3.4% in the AUSEE, and finally to 4.4% in the PARAUSEE; 
and (b) a 10 billion peso ceiling for the increase in central bank domestic credit, which in 
proportional terms was well below the inflation rate anticipated for the year. The policy 
announcement immediately lessened the pressure against the peso, and the next day the 
exchange rate closed at 6.1 pesos.{14} The average for the week ending the first quarter of 1995 
was 6.7. The interesting suggestion is that neither the massive funds supplied by the U.S. 
government, nor the contractionary macroeconomic program initially announced by the 
Mexican government were separately enough to stop the panic. Eventually, it took both to 
stabilize the financial markets. 
7. Conclusions 
In the early nineties there was a remarkable improvement in investor sentiment regarding 
Mexico: there was a resurgence of spontaneous capital flows to the country, the terms of 
funding in the international market became more favorable, and exchange rate policy steadily 
gained credibility. There is evidence that, at least for a segment of investors, this was the 
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situation even in the eve of the peso crisis. This attitude was generally shared by the IMF, which 
consistently praised the Mexican policies. 
The trend was started by the introduction of a new stabilization program and the renegotiation 
of the country's commercial bank debt in the late eighties. Macroeconomic policies during the 
Salinas government were guided by the goal of reducing domestic inflation to international 
levels; fiscal consolidation, in particular, played a critical role. Short term stabilization was 
accompanied by policies of structural reform: trade liberalization, market deregulation, 
privatization. 
In the short run economic performance improved, with rapid disinflation accompanied by 
output growth resumption. Over time, however, there was an erosion in economic results, 
characterized by real currency appreciation, rising current account deficits associated with a 
boom in consumption and bank lending, and falling GDP growth. And yet, optimism among 
international investors prevailed. This strongly suggests that their views were shaped more by 
policies (and perhaps by the resulting medium and long term outlook) than by actual economic 
results (except those concerning inflation). In particular, there was a broad coincidence between 
the policies followed in Mexico and those recommended by the IMF. 
In the end, the prolonged period of exchange rate based disinflation became the direct 
antecedent of the crisis triggered by the peso devaluation of December 1994: the steady real 
appreciation of the currency became a factor behind the reserve shocks of late 1994; and the 
reserve erosion, together with the indexation of domestic debt to the dollar, led to a panic 
driven by default fears. Eventually, it took both a $50 billion package of debt guarantees and a 
severely restrictive macroeconomic program for 1995 to reassure investors and stop the free fall 
of the peso. 
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Two additional issues related to the way investors views were shaped before and after the crisis 
are raised: first, it has been frequently argued that lack of information was a key determinant of 
the crisis. We have seen, however, that information reflecting the erosion in economic 
performance caused by the process of real currency appreciation was available, and that in fact 
there were references to some of its consequences in IMF reports. Lack of information basically 
reduced to data on the availability of international reserves at the central bank, a variable which 
was important only for the timing of the crisis. 
Second, there is the issue of how information regarding fundamentals is interpreted by market 
participants. Before the crisis, in the midst of euphoria, rising current account deficits, falling 
GDP growth rates, booming consumption and bank lending levels, all were generally not 
considered as troublesome. After the devaluation, in contrast, even the moderate external deficit 
anticipated in the initial emergency program for 1995 was deemed too high, forcing the 
government to embark on a much stronger contraction. 
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{l} For a collection of papers on the Mexican crisis, see the November 1996 issue of the 
Journal of International Economics, and the supplement 1, 1996 of the Open Economies Review. 
{2} Basic guidelines were set up in the so-called National Program of Industrial 
Modernization and Foreign Trade 1990-1994(January1990). 
{3} In the final years of the eighties there was as well an emphasis on the need to 
renegotiate the country's external debt to promote domestic economic growth. For instance, in 
the Policy Criteria for 1989 (late 1988), it was stressed that debt renegotiation was a necessary 
condition for growth resumption, in that it would allow a reduction in the transfer of resources 
abroad over a long horizon. The point had been made in the text of a loan agreement with the 
IMF in April 1988 and again by Secretary of the Treasury Pedro Aspe at the XXX Annual 
Meeting of the Interamerican Development Bank (March 1989). 
{4} For a general discussion on this point, see Carden (1994), chapter 6, and more recently 
Edwards (1999). 
{5} Recall from section I, though, that despite the growth of labor productivity registered 
during the period, there was in fact a steady rise in dollar labor costs in the Mexican industry. 
{6} Note, however, that the dramatic change in the currency composition of domestic debt 
after March 1994 (from cetes to tesobonos) has the implication that, even before the second 
speculative attack against the peso took place, the foreign exchange market was not in 
equilibrium at the prevailing interest and exchange rate levels. 
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{7} Our previous analysis suggests, however, that factor (c) was not a determinant of the 
panic. 
{8} See again, however, footnotes 5 and 6. 
{9} Given this assessment of the situation, the eventual deceleration of economic growth in 
Mexico must have been an unexpected result for IMF analysts: for instance, with an actual GDP 
growth rate of 0.6% for 1993, the May and October 1993 Outlooks presented forecasts of 3 and 
2.5%, respectively (tables 3 and 4, respectively). 
{10} On the other side, in the October 1994 World Economic Outlook it was claimed that in 
those countries where capital inflows had responded mainly to programs of fiscal adjustment 
and structural reform, "a tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate is more likely to be 
an equilibrium response to improvements in productivity and profitability, especially in the 
traded-goods sector" (p. 57). This is a standard prediction from the so-called dependent 
economy model (see, for example, Dornbusch 1974). 
{11} Edwards (1997), p. 5, argues that a similar ambiguity can be found in World Bank 
reports. 
{12} Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that the peasant uprising in the southern 
state of Chiapas, on 1 January 1994, had any significant effect on investor sentiment: 
international reserves continued their upward trend, only interrupted by Colosio's 
assassination (figure 5), the country's political risk premium declined (figure 6), and the 
expected depreciation rate began rising only after the murder (figure 9). The only sign of stress 
between January and April was a shift of the exchange rate toward the band's strong half in 
53 
early March, which resulted in a reduction of the maximum depreciation rate (figure 9) and 
hence in the excess expected depreciation (figure 10). 
{13} Analysts in the financial sector had early on expressed their optimistic view that the 
permanence of the orientation of economic policies --especially of exchange rate policy-- was 
ensured, well before the elections, by the pact renewal of September 1994 (see Banamex, 
October 1994). 
{14} The view that the policy priority after the devaluation had to be the control of inflation 













Figure 1. Unit labor cost and labor productivity in the manufactures, 1989-1993. 
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Indexes: 1990=100. Unit costs expressed in U.S. dollars. The figure for 1993 is the average for January-September. Source: INEGI. 
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Figure 5. Private tesobono holdings and international reserves, 1994. 
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Figure 6. Political risk premium, 1994. 
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Estimated as the annualized interest rate differential between 3-month tesobonos and U.S. treasury bills (monthly average; except for December, which 
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Figure 9. Expected and maximum depreciation rates, November 1991- December 1994. 
Peso band Conclusion NAFTA negotiations US Senate NAFTA ratification 
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Weekly series; ends on 16December1994. Source: Banco de Mexico. 
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Figure 10. Excess expected depreciation rate, November 1991- December 1994. 
Peso band Conclusion NAFTA negotiations US Senate NAFTA ratification 



















'<!' ,..... N 
N N N 
°' °' °' I I ..!.. I-< -< ;::1 u ....,., 0 0 I 
~ N ,..... ,..... 
-------------------------------- ---c010sro-mt.fraer --------
N C<) C<) C<) C<) 
°' °' °' °' °' I I I I I u I-< § 0.. > (!) ca (!) 0 
Cl ~ ....,., CJ) z I I ,..... C<) I I!) 
°' ,..... '° N ,..... N 
'<!' 





- - - - - -Presidential elections 
'<!' 









































... ___ ... ___ , , I 







, ' Cete rate ............ 
----~-~-~--~---------------
....... - -




























i:: 30 Q) 
(.) 




°' 00 I 
i:: ro 
i--. 
Figure 12. Inflation and interest rates, January 1989 - December 1991. 
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Monthly series. Inflation is the CPI average annualized variation. The interest rate corresponds to the annualized 28-day cete rate. Source: BD INEGI. 
